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Object based storage devices (OSDs) elevate the level
of abstraction presented to clients, thereby permit-
ting them to offer methods for managing, sharing,
and securing information that go beyond those of-
fered by block-based stores. The Object-Oriented
Storage System (O2S2) architecture presented and
evaluated in this paper implements a virtualization
service to provide object-based storage in a virtu-
alized environment. This service provides a vir-
tual object-based storage device (vOSD) to virtual
machines. The use of vOSDs permits the service
provider, i.e., the vOSD storage domain, to offer
to guest virtual machines new methods for resource
management and consolidation, without requiring
the purchase of physical storage devices that faith-
fully implement OSD functionality. Methods demon-
strated in this paper include improved support for
access control and for heterogeneity of storage de-
vices. Advantages derived from such methods also
include reduced complexity for end clients, i.e., guest
VMs. A prototype PVFS-based O2S2 implementa-
tion demonstrates that its enhanced services can be
provided at low cost, enabled in part by the efficient
utilization of otherwise idle domain resources.
1 Introduction
Storage virtualization is a mature area of comput-
ing, including commercial solutions, such as IBM’s
System Storage DS8000 and EMC’s Centera. Such
‘storage appliances’ are in common use in well-
networked environments like data centers, but low
cost implementations have even enabled them for per-
sonal/home systems [4]. Their realizations utilize
technologies like Network Attached Storage (NAS)
and Storage Area Networks (SANs) to provide end
clients with virtualized storage devices, where NAS
and SAN technologies differ in the interfaces they
provide to the end client. A SAN solution provides
low-level block-based storage access, while a NAS so-
lution provides higher-level file-based access. Ab-
stracting from these differences and for simplicity,
when referring to NAS or SAN, this paper terms the
entity implementing any such virtualized storage so-
lution a storage domain.
Any storage domain must answer multiple ques-
tions, including (1) what is the access interface pro-
vided to the client – block based vs. object (file)
based, and (2) how is the data stored on (mapped
to) physical devices? Depending on the answer to
(1), the storage domain has different degrees of free-
dom concerning how to store the data. For exam-
ple, if the interface is block-level, any storage decision
must be made at that granularity, which also means
that the client has the obligation to make such de-
cisions, thereby increasing client complexity and re-
ducing flexibility for the storage domain. Further,
because of the large overheads of maintaining meta-
data about every single block, the storage domain is
typically agnostic of the properties of the actual data
stored, also implying that useful device properties like
fault tolerance and striped I/O must be realized at
the virtual block device granularity. In contrast, im-
proved solutions are possible when allowing proper-
ties to be maintained on a per object basis, where
an object-based interface provides opportunities for
new reliability methods [57], for increased scalabil-
ity [58, 24], for increased resource consolidation, and
for data sharing among multiple clients [25].
Following the paradigm of object based storage,
this paper presents the design and implementation
of an Object-Oriented Storage System (O2S2) archi-
tecture that can provide virtual object-store devices
(vOSDs) and services to any virtual machine via the
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vOSD storage domain, without the need for special-
ized object storage hardware [7]. Moreover, these
vOSDs can provide semantically enhanced – logical
– object storage. That is, for any object stored by
a client on a vOSD, the latter can store additional
attributes (i.e., metadata) such as provenance [11],
consistency [38], and client-specific information per-
taining to the semantics of its content (e.g., an object
containing a ‘health’ record or one that contains mul-
timedia data). Accordingly, some of these vOSD ob-
ject attributes will be solely managed by the vOSD
storage domain, in a client-oblivious manner, while
others are shared between the clients and the do-
main. Regardless of how such management is per-
formed, however, it is these attributes, along with the
attributes of the physical devices being managed by
the vOSD storage domain, that permit the domain to
provide enhanced functionality and services to stor-
age clients. In contrast, more traditionally, a vOSD
stores raw data like that associated with files in a
filesystem and limited semantic meta-data associated
with these files, such as primitive access control in-
formation, size, type of data, and useful timestamps.
Beyond presenting the O2S2 architecture and its
prototype implementation, our research also explores
new and useful functionality associated with vOSDs.
One class of such functionality, focused on the way
objects are stored, concerns exploiting the different
properties of physical storage media. The idea is
that by aggregating an ensemble of physical devices, a
storage domain can often provide better performance
or enhanced functionality to the virtual device than
by using a single physical device [48]. In addition,
semantic information about the objects being stored
can be used when aggregating physical devices. For
example, an object-based file store may provide strip-
ing and RAID functionalities only to the objects that
actually require them. As another example, the map-
ping between an object and a particular physical de-
vice can be decided based on object or device at-
tributes, such as those pertaining to privacy and mo-
bility constraints. In fact, such semantic aggregation
is not unique to storage devices. Its use with camera
devices, for instance, makes it possible to seamlessly
join video streams from multiple cameras in order
to provide a virtual video wall [53]. We note that
semantic aggregation cannot be done with SAN solu-
tions or with lower level device aggregation like that
provided by the Logical Volume Manager [10]. This
is because it is the object based interface and the ob-
ject attributes that enable semantic aggregation at
object granularity.
Another class of functionality enabled by the O2S2
architecture is fine-grained, object-based, access con-
trol. Based on the labels of objects and the clients
who access them, the vOSD storage domain imple-
ments Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [26]. En-
forcing access control at object granularity provides
sharing and consolidation of resources superior to
that offered by the large storage partitions present
in block-based systems. Further, the storage domain
can be integrated with the trust management compo-
nent of a platform, where it can utilize ‘trust’ related
information about a client to enforce dynamic RBAC.
Additionally, such access control enables object-level
logging of a client’s accesses, which can be used to
enhance security.
An important element of the O2S2 architecture
is its use of a ‘storage domain’. This provides
independence from specialized storage hardware,
such as object stores [7] and other enhanced disk-
controllers [60]. In addition, the object properties
implemented by a storage domain and desired by end
users can transcend what is offered by backend hard-
ware. Examples include encryption or secret shar-
ing [49] techniques and transformation of data in
client-specific ways [34], such as for obfuscation and
specialization [61] purposes.
Finally, while vOSD storage domains can be con-
structed in many ways, this paper describes domain
realizations geared to meet the challenges of virtual-
ized execution environments. In this context, vOSD
storage domain clients are Virtual Machines (VMs),
which execute on a Virtualized Platform provided by
a hypervisor or Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).
Additional Service VMs implement virtualized ser-
vices for these VMs. The vOSD storage domain im-
plements the storage service inside a Service VM;
other examples include ‘Dom0’ providing network vir-
tualization [43] and the VMedia runtime [45] provid-
ing multimedia device virtualization. Experimental
evaluations presented in this paper, therefore, are car-
ried out in the contexts of VMs, VM usage of the
vOSD storage domain, and the VM-level overheads
experienced in these settings.
Experimental results based on a PVFS-based pro-
totype implementation of O2S2 architecture and its
realization of vOSDs demonstrate (1) that the cost
imposed by enhanced vOSD functionalities is low and
(2) that such functionality scales well with an increas-
ing number of client VMs. In particular, the cost of
per-object access control is 2.5% and .4% for large
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reads and large writes, respectively, as compared to
the case where no access control is enforced. Also, by
using the resources available at the vOSD storage do-
main, it is possible to obtain performance benefits of
∼ 3X for large reads, as compared to current virtual
block based storage solutions in the Xen virtualiza-
tion environment.
2 Motivation
This section describes the scenarios that motivate
the design of the O2S2 enhanced storage architec-
ture. It describes how this architecture enables im-
proved performance, better resource consolidation,
easier trust management, and increased usability in
heterogeneous storage environments.
2.1 Object-based Storage Interfaces
Object-based storage interfaces, like those presented
by the file-based interfaces of cluster or distributed
file systems (e.g., PVFS [21], LWFS [38], Lus-
tre [6] and Coda [19]), and by object storage devices
(OSDs) [56, 27, 25], provide notable benefits for the
storage client. For instance, when the tasks of stor-
age allocation and access control are delegated to the
storage domain, this simplifies the client’s kernel in
that it is only required to run a minimal file sys-
tem. Further, since operating systems already main-
tain information, both data and meta-data, grouped
at file-level, object-based storage interfaces provide
an appropriate match between the capabilities of the
virtual device and the requirements of the client. Fig-
ure 1, derived from [56], highlights the differences be-
tween an object- and a block-based interface. vOSDs
and the O2S2 architecture underlying them exploit
these differences to maintain and use novel meta-data
with storage objects, as explained in Section 2.2.1 be-
low.
The vOSD storage domain benefits from the pres-
ence of object based interfaces, because storage man-
agement can be performed at a semantically mean-
ingful level. This facilitates sharing and presenting
opportunities for resource consolidation, and more
importantly, it provides opportunities for enhanced
virtual storage, based on additional per-object meta-
data, at costs that scale with the number of objects
rather than with object size (i.e., number of blocks
in an object). Further, since the type of storage de-
vices used by vOSD storage domains is orthogonal
to the interface provided to clients, the implementa-
Figure 1: Comparison of block- and object-based in-
terfaces for storage clients
tion of vOSD does not require physical OSDs. The
use of such new physical devices can reduce the costs
of storage management in a SAN environment, since
host-resident space allocation functionality of a stor-
age domain is no longer required. On the other hand
and as shown in this paper, a resource-rich realiza-
tion of a vOSD storage domain can exploit the ad-
ditional compute resources available at host-level to
provide new and useful storage functionality to end
clients and/or to shift certain computational tasks
from clients to storage domains. Idle cycles typically
available on storage domains [42] demonstrate the vi-
ability of this approach, as discussed further in Sec-
tion 3.
2.2 Storage in Virtualized Systems
The realization of the O2S2 architecture presented
in this paper is based on common methods for plat-
form and storage virtualization. Stated explicitly,
it satisfies the storage needs of virtual machines as
storage clients by utilizing a separate storage do-
main onto the same physical platform as the guest.
This architecture affords the common advantages as-
cribed to virtualized resources, including improved
resource consolidation, better isolation across differ-
ent applications, and reduced vulnerabilities in per-
sonal/home environments. Additional advantages in-
clude improved manageability, as argued by Chan-
dra et al [23]. In contrast to current virtualization
systems [18, 50], however, our approach uses vOSDs
to replace the block-based storage interfaces, such as
IDE and SCSI, currently being used. The intent, of
course, is to attain the goals of improved manageabil-
ity and enhanced functionality articulated earlier.
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2.2.1 From Virtualized to Security-enhanced
and Trusted Object Stores
In order to maintain security isolation among mul-
tiple vOSDs, the vOSD storage domain employs
object-level access control. This allows sharing physi-
cal storage space among multiple vOSDs at an object
granularity. This access control is Role Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) based on labels or roles, which
define the capability of a storage client. The stor-
age domain maintains these labels for all the objects
it stores, and utilizes an external trusted entity for
the management of labels associated with a storage
client. This enables the storage domain to provide
access control functionality at a reduced cost.
Another key advantage of our virtualization-based
realization of vOSD storage domain is that it can
monitor, inspect, and manage guest VMs and their
use of storage ‘from the outside’, using privileged do-
mains that are not subject to the same attacks or
failures faced by guests running standard operating
systems and applications across open network envi-
ronments. These privileged management domains or
‘trust controllers’ can use VM introspection (e.g., us-
ing the XenAccess [14] facility developed in our re-
search), behavior monitoring (e.g., as done in our
work on power management [37]), or I/O traffic mon-
itoring to continually assess VM ‘health’ or secu-
rity [40]. Such domains can even intercept I/O re-
quests to implement new security services like fire-
walls or intrusion detection [9] or to re-direct certain
VM actions to guarantee desired safety properties for
potentially unsafe code [29].
Leveraging the abilities of access control and exter-
nal monitoring provided by system virtualization, the
O2S2 architecture permits storage domains to enforce
desired access controls on their data. This is done by
using online monitoring to establish certain ‘trust’
values for guest VMs and for the platforms on which
they run [52], and then, enforcing access controls to
ensure that data requiring certain levels of trust is
accessed only by those VMs on those machines that
meet those requirements. Stated differently, these
‘trust’ values can dynamically change the labels or
capabilities of a client. Even though a client’s label
might match the label of a particular object, a dy-
namic label based on the original label and ‘trust’
value might not, resulting in declined access.
Underlying these online matching processes, of
course, are basic actions taken by storage domains
that (1) track (i.e., monitor) and label (i.e., compute
and maintain trust-relevant metadata) the data items
written and read by certain guest VMs, and (2) en-
force that data items are stored and accessed only
when trust values match, as per the access control or
security policies stated by system administrators. A
sample use case for such functionality considers doc-
tors or nurses who create and access patient records.
Here, records are labeled as per the sources that pro-
duce them, accesses require appropriate identities or
roles, and in addition, they require that such accesses
are only carried out from trusted platforms and guest
VMs. The vOSD storage domain enforces policies like
these by checking the labels (i.e., metadata) associ-
ated with data objects like patient records against
the trust values of the guest VMs performing such
accesses. It also enforces such properties for record
storage, for instance, that certain patient records are
stored on disks present at a location with better phys-
ical security.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between a dis-
tributed application running inside application VMs
and a vOSD storage domain. The storage domain
is a trusted entity and enforces access control itself,
with the help of certain security extensions in the hy-
pervisor. The application’s behavior contributes to
its “trust” value, as perceived by the trust controller
and exported to the storage domain. If some part
of the application runs on an untrusted platform, its
“trust” value must be defined by a remote trust con-
troller running on a trusted machine.
Fine-grained access control and metric like ‘trust’
are particularly relevant in data center settings,
where their use extends the measures used for ser-
vice level agreements (SLAs), which are typically de-
fined to provide statistical guarantees on various per-
formance characteristics of services, such as band-
width and latency [22]. This extension is important
because with multiple compute VMs [1] or storage
services [2] hosted by the data center, service clients
can no longer control those services’ uses of data cen-
ter resources. In this context, a secure and trusted
vOSD storage domain can provide strong guarantees
to a VM that houses sensitive information (e.g., pa-
tient records and proprietary art work) that this in-
formation will only be stored on some few identifiable
disks, thereby reducing the risk of data being stolen
or being retained after the client’s run has completed.
Further, when upholding the integrity of a client’s ac-
tions in a virtualized environment, if data is erased by
the client, the service provider must ensure that none
of this data is left anywhere in the system. This can
be achieved with an improved accounting by storage
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Figure 2: Storage domain as a trusted object store.
Entities in gray are trusted
domains about which client’s data is stored on which
physical media. Such accounting functionality can
also help with data recovery upon loss, media recov-
ery, and similar tasks.
Finally, a trusted vOSD object store can be used
to enhance trust management itself. In particular, a
VM’s access log maintained by the vOSD storage do-
main can be used to generate a behavior profile for the
VM at object granularity. Such profiles are easier to
manage and more scalable than those based on block-
level information [40], since monitoring need not deal
with client-specific information, e.g., the file-system
layout. Behavior profiles can then be used to derive
‘trust’ values for the VM. Also, in case of a secu-
rity concern, such as a world-wide virus spread, these
profiles can be quickly disseminated, as signatures, to
preemptively stop damaged domains from being run
or used, until the problem is corrected.
An extension of the security-enhanced vOSDs pre-
sented in this paper concern the auditability of
such assurances. This may require specialized hard-
ware such as Write-Once-Read-Multiple (WORM)
devices [55] and an open logging infrastructure with
access provided to clients. With such support, clients
can then corroborate the actions taken by the service
provider in response to their own actions, and they
can ensure that the identities of the physical devices
used match the ones enforced by the SLA. Further-
more, immutable content on WORM devices can be
upheld legally in case of disputes.
2.3 Usability in Personal/Home Envi-
ronments
As stated earlier, the implementation of a vOSD does
not rely on specific storage media or subsystems. This
affords us with substantial advantages in environ-
ments that employ diverse storage devices and where
device usage depends on dynamic measures like cur-
rent context. In home or personal environments, for
instance, examples include a user storing media files
on a video/mp3 player, personal contact information
on a cell phone/PDA, running applications from lo-
cal hard disk, and archiving information on a high
capacity USB hard disk and/or on DVD media.
The O2S2 architecture can easily exploit diverse
devices used in dynamic settings, where based on the
contextual properties of each object designated by its
owner and that of storage devices, the vOSD storage
domain finds the best match for storing an object in
a client oblivious manner, thereby relieving applica-
tion VMs from making these decisions. One method
is to store objects based on their performance metrics
and/or on the performance properties of storage de-
vices, in a manner similar to that of Stonehenge [30].
Another method uses access control based on label-
ing, which makes it possible to consider personal de-
vices as potential storage media, by ensuring that cer-
tain data is stored and/or accessed only on certain de-
vices. As a concrete scenario, consider user ‘A’ who
has connected his iPod to her home PC. The iPod
is labeled with the contextual label ‘media’ and with
the access control label ‘VM A’. The virtual machine
owned by ‘A’ is also labeled as ‘VM A’. The vOSD
storage domain, then, makes the content of the iPod
available via the virtual disk for ‘VM A’. Also, if ‘A’
downloads a multimedia content from the internet
and sets its contextual label to ‘media’, the content
will automatically be stored on the iPod. From then
on, this content will be available to ‘A’ ‘on the go’.
In contrast, all temporary files created by ‘VM A’ are
stored on the generic hard disk. In this manner, the
vOSD storage domain performs the semantic aggre-
gation of hard disk and iPod to present a single vOSD
to ‘VM A’.
In summary, the O2S2 architecture provides en-
hanced storage for clients in virtualized environ-
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Figure 3: O2S2 architecture
ments. A key component of this architecture is
its object-based interface for virtualized storage ac-
cess for client VMs, providing benefits that include
improved resource consolidation, better usability in
heterogeneous environments, and object-level access
control and trust management.
3 Architecture
The Object-Oriented Storage System (O2S2) has
three main components:
• client-side virtual object-store device (vOSD)
and the associated access interface provide to
guest VM.
• communication channel between virtual object-
store device and storage domain.
• the vOSD storage domain.
Figure 3 depicts relationship between these com-
ponents.
A storage client uses a vOSD-specific inter-
face to initiate storage requests, such as the cre-
ation/removal of objects and I/O on their content.
These requests are communicated to the vOSD stor-
age domain by the vOSD client-side driver using the
communication channel. The job of the vOSD stor-
age domain is to service these requests and provide
mediated access to the physical storage devices.
The vOSD storage domain works as a backend for
client vOSDs. It is a distributed service and is com-
posed of one or more storage servers. Each storage
server has multiple sub-components, described as fol-
lows:
• Storage virtualization. This component imple-
ments the support of multiple client vOSDs over
shared physical storage and any conversions that
might be required for client specific interfaces,
such as converting data read from local disks into
NFS read responses. This component also works
as the back-end of the vOSD, in that any ac-
tion performed on the vOSD is received by this
component. These actions are checked for ap-
propriate access restrictions and converted into
requests for the storage management component.
• Storage management. This component facili-
tates the management of physical storage de-
vices. In particular, it implements the allocation
of physical storage corresponding to the objects
in the vOSD and it implements any operations
on them, including I/O.
• Access control Module (ACM). This component
enforces per-object access control and is a key
element for implementing security, privacy and
trust for the clients. The basis for access con-
trol are labels attached to clients and to objects.
These labels behave as capabilities. Each object
contains one or more labels, which are matched
according to a policy with the label of the clients
accessing the object. Labels associated with
clients are not provided by the ACM itself, and
are not part of the communication protocol be-
tween the vOSD storage domain and the storage
client. Rather, clients’ labels are provided by an
external trusted entity, the hypervisor. This del-
egation greatly simplifies the storage domain ar-
chitecture, since ACM need only implement en-
forcement, and not deal with label (capability)
management of clients at all. Issues related with
this management include capability generation,
dissemination, enforcing expiration, and dealing
with security aspects of the communication pro-
tocol, such as spoofing and replay attacks [27].
In contrast, other storage systems, such as Lus-
tre [6], implement this management of client ca-
pabilities as a part of the storage system itself.
Such access controls are in addition to any access
controls implemented by guest virtual machines
based on certain user credentials, such as user
and group identifiers.
4 Implementation
Our prototype implementation of O2S2 architecture
is based on the PVFS file-system [21, 33]. It runs on
a platform virtualized with Xen [43]. Figure 4 shows
the different components of this implementation.
A distributed file-system is chosen as a way to im-
plement the prototype because such file-systems are
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Figure 4: PVFS based object-oriented storage system
commonly used in distributed environments to im-
plement storage solutions that (1) enable resource
consolidation on servers and (2) allow data sharing
among multiple clients. Such sharing is enabled by
the file-system’s provision of a higher-level abstrac-
tion to clients. Our choice of the PVFS cluster file-
system, rather than using NFS or Coda, is due to its
ability to separate meta-data and data, and because
it makes it possible to distribute data among mul-
tiple servers for performance. These properties also
enable extensions that can provide differentiated stor-
age. We specifically chose PVFS2 since it is mostly
implemented in user space, which makes it easy to
modify and debug, unlike, e.g., Lustre [6], which is
implemented in the kernel. Further, PVFS2 is a freely
available, mature, and stable product.
4.1 PVFS Background
The client side vOSD is provided as a PVFS volume
where objects are stored as PVFS files. The core of
the PVFS file-system is implemented in user space.
User-level applications can use a PVFS specific API
and its client library to make PVFS system calls to
access these files. These files can also be accessed by
unmodified user space applications relying on the ker-
nel’s VFS layer to hide file system details. To enable
this, the PVFS file-system provides a kernel driver
that registers the file system with the kernel’s VFS
layer. This enables mounting the vOSD in the file
hierarchy of the client. Any I/O in vOSD file space
is directed to the PVFS kernel driver by the VFS
layer. The kernel driver marshals the VFS request
into a PVFS request and communicates it to a user-
level application, called the PVFS core. This appli-
cation works as a proxy to make PVFS system calls
on behalf of the kernel driver. Similarly, all responses
received by this application are communicated back
to the driver, which converts it into appropriate VFS
responses and hands it to the VFS layer.
Currently, the PVFS client component does not in-
terface with the client kernel’s page cache. Bypassing
the page cache makes the file system design simple,
since there is no client level consistency to maintain
in a shared environment. However, this also means
that every VFS request must be communicated to
the storage domain. This reduces the performance
for I/O operations with small block sizes. In con-
trast, PVFS performs well for large block sizes and
large files.
The vOSD storage domain is implemented as mul-
tiple storage servers, each of which is a PVFS server.
In our prototype implementation, all of these servers
execute in the Dom0. Hence, the vOSD storage do-
main provides an example of a host-based iConnect
realization [44].
A PVFS server is a user-level entity and is clas-
sified as either a meta-data server (MDS) or a I/O
server. As the name suggests, a MDS manages
meta-information about a PVFS file, such as at-
tributes (length, last modification timestamp etc.)
and access-control information (label of the file, list
of user ids allowed access etc.). Some of the meta-
information depends on the type of file. For exam-
ple, for a regular PVFS file, its meta-data contains
information about the I/O servers that are in use
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for storing the data. PVFS also supports extended
attributes, which can be user or system defined arbi-
trary key-value pairs. I/O servers are used to store
actual data associated with a PVFS file.
PVFS servers use a combination of Berkeley
DB [39] and files in the underlying file system – the
former is used to store meta-data whereas data is
stored in the latter. The PVFS filesystem might cre-
ate multiple chunks for a PVFS file in order to par-
allelize access to data, each of which is a file stored
at an I/O server.
Each PVFS server manages a storage space, which
is a part of the local file system that it uses to store
data. In our implementation, different storage spaces
reside on different physical disk partitions. These
disk partitions can be spread among multiple disks.
The communication between a PVFS client, i.e., a
guest VM, and PVFS servers, i.e., the storage servers
of the vOSD storage domain utilizes TCP/IP net-
working over virtual NICs provided by Xen.
4.2 Extensions to the PVFS-based
Storage Domain
The vOSD storage domain that provides enhanced
object-based storage is realized as an extension of the
core PVFS implementation.
First, additional attributes, called IOHints, and ac-
cess control labels, called acm-labels, are associated
with a PVFS server’s storage space. By associating a
particular physical disk partition to a storage space,
these IOHints and acm-labels also extend to the level
of a physical disk partition. This is the lowest gran-
ularity of meta-data managed by the vOSD storage
domain.
Second, with each PVFS file object stored in
client’s vOSD, two extended attributes are associ-
ated – user.iohint and system.acmlabel. The former
is modifiable by the user, while the latter is only
modifiable by the vOSD storage domain. We also
extend the PVFS client library, and correspondingly
the server-side PVFS implementation, to include a
file-system call, called extended create or ecreate to
create a file with specified extended attributes.
The ACM is implemented by extending the PVFS
server to include certain checks. These checks are in-
cluded in the prelude part of every request serviced by
the server. The type of access control implemented is
Mandatory Access Control [26], where access rights of
an object are non-transferable from one client to an-
other without the intervention of the hypervisor and
the vOSD storage domain. The ACM utilizes the in-
formation provided by the secure hypervisor (sHype)
extension of Xen hypervisor [47] and, optionally, by
the trust controller.
Xen’s sHype extension implements a repository of
one static label per VM and one static label per phys-
ical resource, such as NIC and harddisk partition.
Based on a matching policy, it also enforces manda-
tory access control – a VM can only access a physical
resource if they both have the same label. These la-
bels can be viewed as roles, hence this type of access
control is an example of Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) [26]. Currently, Xen supports bind time ac-
cess control, i.e., labels are only matched at the time
a guest VM is created. Also, the label associated with
a VM does not change for the lifetime of a VM. This
may change in the future, e.g., based on the identity
of the physical platform on which the VM executes,
a VM’s label could change.
Since sHype does not define labels for anything
other than VMs and physical resources, services like
the vOSD storage domain must currently implement
access control themselves. Toward this end, we use
sHype as a repository for guest VM labels. The vOSD
storage domain keeps its own labels for each server’s
and for each PVFS file object stored, as described
earlier. Also, since the information sHype only main-
tains label information for clients specific to a phys-
ical platform, it implies that all storage servers of
the vOSD storage domain need to coexist on the
same platform. However, it is possible to distribute
them among multiple machines by incorporating a
distributed trust management solution, such as sha-
mon [35] in the O2S2 architecture.
4.2.1 Trust Controller
A trust controller is an optional component that can
be utilized with the storage domain to enhance its
access control enforcement. The functionality of a
trust controller is to maintain a “trust” value for a
guest VM. It utilizes one or more monitoring compo-
nents that provide behavioral information about the
guest VM. The “trust” value is a function of current
behavioral information and of a trust policy. In our
prototype, behavioral information is captured using a
network monitoring component (netmon), which re-
sides in the Dom0 kernel and essentially, extends the
Xen virtual NIC backend by monitoring the network
traffic to/from a guest VM.
Figure 5 shows the interaction between netmon
and the trust controller. Netmon operates as fol-
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Figure 5: Interaction between trust controller and
Netmon
lows. Based on a rule engine, it intercepts certain
packets. Contents of these packets, such as headers
of different protocol stacks and payload, generate the
desired behavioral information. Further details about
the netmon prototype along with performance anal-
ysis are described elsewhere, as part of the ProtectIT
framework [32].
The current netmon prototype provides informa-
tion pertaining to remote access to a guest VM, such
as the number of open telnet and ssh connections,
and the amounts of data transferred by these open
connections. This information is exported to the
trust controller using the /proc interface. Addition-
ally, netmon notifies the trust controller proactively
when the information monitored by netmon changes.
Since the trust controller is a part of the storage do-
main prototype in user space, kernel space netmon
utilizes standard kernel-to-user space asynchronous
signals for notification. The trust controller, then,
accesses the network information via the /proc inter-
face, and updates the “trust” value of the guest VM
based on a specific trust model. These updates in
“trust” value affect the overall access control for the
guest VM, depending on the specific policy in use by
the storage domain. An example trust model, along
with example access control policies are described in
detail in Section 5.1.
4.3 Discussion – Alternative Choices
Although our current prototype of the O2S2 architec-
ture uses PVFS, the architecture itself is generic and
can utilize alternative means to implement its compo-
nents. Some of these alternatives are discussed in this
section. Table 1 also summarizes these alternatives.
The client side virtual object-storage device
(vOSD) is characterized by the interface it provides
to the client kernel. As an alternative to the file-
system API, it could utilize a device access protocol,
such as T10 [56], which is an enhancement of SCSI. In
this case, the device driver sets up the virtual device
as part of the SCSI device stack as a SCSI initiator.
A shim file system layer [54] is required to present
a file-system interface on top of this virtual device,
which then interfaces to the VFS layer in the kernel.
Alternatively, as is the case with PVFS and other dis-
tributed file-systems, this device can also be directly
accessed by user space applications via libraries.
The client vOSD driver formats storage requests
as messages based on a specific protocol and for-
wards them to the storage domain. For example, a
vOSD based on NFS can use NFS-specific messages
to communicate with the storage domain. However,
it is also possible for a vOSD to provide an inter-
face to the client that is entirely different from the
one used to access the storage domain. For example,
a vOSD providing a PVFS interface to the storage
client could convert PVFS-specific messages to T10
commands that can then be sent to a storage domain
which works as the OSD target [24]. Another exam-
ple of such a protocol conversion is when the storage
domain performs this conversion prior to performing
actual storage virtualization, management and access
control tasks [28].
Since the vOSD storage domain is a distributed ser-
vice, there are many ways to implement each storage
server: as a user-level application (e.g., our current
prototype), as a kernel-level service (e.g., Lustre), or
as a runtime inside a dedicated and specialized VM
of its own. Many commercial SAN and NAS imple-
mentations also fall into the first two categories. Al-
though we are not aware of an example of a storage
domain comprised of multiple specialized VMs, an
approach similar to that of Libra [17] is also feasible
for implementing a storage server. IBM’s Tiburon
project [12] uses a similar approach.
Another related issue for implementing the vOSD
storage domain concerns the malleability of the en-
hanced functionalities being exported (i.e., whether
there is a predefined set and/or whether a client must
choose among them, or whether the set can be defined
by the client). Since these functionalities are domain
specific, e.g., they may differ for multimedia vs. file
storage, there are multiple approaches for providing
an interface for defining these functionalities. Exam-
ples include a domain specific language [3] and ar-
bitrary binaries executing inside isolated containers,
such as processes and VMs. In this work, we focus
on a fixed set of functionalities offered by the vOSD
storage domain – the dynamic extension of storage
domains by a client is part of our future work.
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Table 1: Summary of design choices for various components of O2S2 architecture
Component Choices





Filesystem specific, T10 based
Storage Server User process, Kernel service, Specialized VM
Objects for storage management Files on local file-system, OSD objects
The job of the storage virtualization component
is to map a vOSD object access request to a set of
objects managed by the storage management com-
ponent. The storage management component man-
ages these objects with the help of the underlying
platform’s storage services. For example, our current
PVFS based prototype and many other cluster file-
system servers use local file systems, such as ext3,
of the machines on which they run to store these ob-
jects as files. If the underlying platform has OSDs at-
tached to it, these objects could be provided by the
device itself. In this case, the storage management
component runs on the OSD that houses the particu-
lar object being accessed. In a similar fashion, ACM
could be located on the device itself.
5 Functionalities
This section describes various functionalities of the
vOSD storage domain implementation and demon-
strates how these functionalities provide enhanced
vOSDs to storage clients.
5.1 Object-based Access Control
The vOSD storage domain implements per-object,
multi-layer, role based access control (RBAC). RBAC
is based on labels associated with clients, physical
storage devices, and individual objects stored in those
devices.
On each request, a storage server first determines
the client’s label. Currently, each client is a VM phys-
ically located on the local machine with IPs in a pri-
vate subnet. By using the association of a client’s
IP address with its VM id, the storage server obtains
the client’s label from Xen/sHype. This label is then
cached for the lifetime of the VM. Next, this label
is matched against labels of the storage space being
managed by the server. In case of a mismatch, the
request is denied. Otherwise, if a request does not
pertain to a specific object in the storage space, such
as a request to obtain the PVFS configuration from
the storage domain’s MDS, the access control returns
success, and the request is allowed to continue.
If a request pertains to a specific object, labels of
that object (stored as system.acmlabel extended at-
tributes) are matched with the client’s label. In case
of a mismatch, the request is denied, otherwise is al-
lowed to continue.
For each PVFS file created by the client in vOSD,
all of the objects stored in the storage space of a
server inherit the client’s label. For example, for a file
create operation by a client with label WebSurfing,
the meta-data object and one or more data-objects,
created on MDS and I/O servers respectively, con-
tain system.acmlabel attribute set as WebSurfing. It
is possible to append more labels to an object from
a privileged client (such as Dom0) – hence an object
can be shared among multiple clients. Alternatively,
a “group” type label can be utilized for sharing pur-
pose, where the hypervisor maintains the association
of a client to a group, and the individual object is
labeled with the “group” label. The latter approach
is currently part of our future work.
A client’s label need not be statically defined. It
can be dynamically computed based on a function of
the initial static label assigned by the VMM and the
“trust” value of the client, as determined by the trust
controller. This dynamic label is equivalent to a dy-
namic role assignment for the client – hence the access
control implemented by the storage domain based on
dynamic role assignment can be viewed as a special
form of RBAC, termed dynamic RBAC. Dynamic
RBAC provides more flexibility than static RBAC,
which only utilizes static labels.
The trust controller computes the “trust” values
of the guest VM based on a simple trust model,
which defines floating values for “trust” in the range
(0.0, 1.0]. These “trust” values are based on the num-
ber of open telnet and ssh connections with the VM
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as the server, computed according to the following
formula:
“trust” = 1/(1+number of active ssh connections+number of active telnet connections)
(1)
The information related to the number of open con-
nections is provided by netmon, as described earlier.
Based on this floating “trust” value and the client
VM’s static label (labelstatic), the storage domain
can use different policies to generate client VM’s dy-
namic label (labeldynamic). Two such policies and
their application scenarios are described next.
Policy 1
if “trust” == 1.0 then
labeldynamic = labelstatic
else if “trust” < 1.0 then
labeldynamic = NULL
end if
A NULL label by default denies any access. Pol-
icy 1 implies that when a VM has any open ssh or
telnet connections, it cannot access any object in the
vOSD.
Policy 2 defines dynamic labels for different
“trust” values. A dynamic label is constructed by
appending access restrictions to the static label. Ac-
cess restrictions are represented as an AND of NOTs
((!T1)&(!T2)& · · ·&(!Tn)), where each Ti, i ∈ 1, n is a
specific access type. Examples of these access types
used in policy 2 are:
• DW – data write,
• DR – data read,
• MDRW – meta-data read write.
For example, a dynamic label labeldynamic =
labelstatic & (!DW) & (!DR) evaluates to NULL for
access types of data write and data read, but eval-
uates to labelstatic for meta-data read write. This
dynamically evaluated label is then matched against
the object’s label for access control purposes.
Object-based access control enables the efficient
sharing of physical devices, since the granularity of
access control can be per-object rather than target-
ing larger disk partitions. Hence, objects from multi-
ple vOSDs can be stored on the same physical disk,
which reduces fragmentation and increases utiliza-
tion. Second, objects from multiple vOSDs can be
shared among multiple clients – by assigning multi-
ple labels to this object pertaining to multiple clients.
Policy 2
if “trust” == 1.0 then
labeldynamic = labelstatic
else if “trust” ≥ 0.50 then
labeldynamic = labelstatic & (!DW)
else if “trust” ≥ 0.33 then
labeldynamic = labelstatic & (!DW) & (!DR)
else if “trust” ≥ 0.25 then
labeldynamic =
labelstatic & (!DW) & (!DR) & (!MDRW)
end if
Third, a storage domain level access control can be a
part of a multi-layer access control solution [41]. For
example, a client may impose further role-based ac-
cess control for multiple users, such as in SELinux [8].
5.2 Semantic Aggregation of Multiple
Storage Devices
In a heterogeneous storage environment, e.g., a
home/personal environment, the vOSD storage do-
main collectively utilizes the ensemble to storage de-
vices to store objects from various vOSDs. An object
is stored on the storage space of a specific storage
server, based on its attributes (e.g., user.iohint and
type), and IOHints of the storage server. For exam-
ple, an object with user.iohint attribute set to ‘X’ can
only be stored at server(s) whose storage space con-
tains ‘X’ (or generic) as a IOHint. These labels can
be chosen based on any policy, e.g., physical device
specific characteristics. Such semantic aggregation of
multiple storage devices based on objects’ properties
enables differentiated storage for a vOSD. Here, costs
associated with deciding which storage server to use
are one time and are paid at the time when an object
is created. Afterwards, an object’s I/O performance
depends on the I/O performance of the specific stor-
age server(s), which itself depends on the share of
resources (such as disk bandwidth and CPU) associ-
ated with these server(s).
Differentiated storage provides multiple benefits,
including easier data management and performance
isolation among multiple clients and multiple types of
applications in a client. Performance isolation is pro-
vided by storing isolated objects on different servers
using different disks for storage space. An example is
storing metadata on a MDS using a faster flash based
disk, while storing sequential data on an I/O server
using a high capacity SCSI disk. In this fashion, the
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vOSD storage domain can minimize the performance
impact of extensive meta-data I/O performed by a
VM, e.g., searching for a particular file, on a VM
that performs streaming data I/O, e.g., watching a
movie. Easier management results from the fact that
data can be stored on a device based on its utility, as
suggested earlier in Section 2.
6 Experimental Evaluation
Experimental evaluation of the prototype O2S2 im-
plementation is carried out on a dual-core, 3GHz, 64-
bit x86 CPU based server class machine with 1GB
RAM and 160GB SATA, 7200 RPM hard disk with
8MB cache. The hypervisor used is Xen version 3.0.4
with sHype enabled. The policy used by sHype is
a simple type enforcement policy. The privileged
VM, Dom0, is assigned 512MB RAM and exclusive
access to one physical processor. The second pro-
cessor is shared among different guest VMs. For
our experiments, each guest VM is configured with
128MB RAM. Both Dom0 and guest VMs run a para-
virtualized Linux kernel based on version 2.6.16.33.
The vOSD storage domain, which resides in Dom0’s
user space, and vOSDs it provides to a client are
based on PVFS version 2.6.3.
6.1 Microbenchmarks
These experiments measure the basic costs of imple-
menting enhanced functionality in the storage do-
main, namely object-level access control and differ-
entiated storage. For the latter, we also provide a
quantitative evaluation of the potential benefits in
terms of the performance isolation it provides.
6.1.1 Access Control Module
Performance For analyzing the costs associated
with ACM, we execute various PVFS system calls
on a vOSD from a guest VM, with and without ACM
present in the vOSD storage domain. The storage do-
main runs two storage servers – one MDS and one I/O
server, both sharing the same disk for their storage
space. The application executing these system calls
directly uses PVFS’s client libraries, without having
to go through the kernel’s VFS layer.
Figure 6 depicts the normalized latency comparison
for some of these system calls with and without ACM,
using the latter as the base. The figure also includes
the total number of access control checks performed
Figure 6: Performance comparison of PVFS system
calls with- and without-ACM in the vOSD storage
domain
for each system call, followed by its name on the x-
axis in the following format: (#Server ACM checks+
#Object ACM checks). Since ACM caches a client’s
labels from Xen/sHype, the cost of a Server ACM
check involves label matching only. The cost of an
Object ACM check requires accessing its extended
attribute (system.acmlabel) from PVFS’s storage, fol-
lowed by label matching. We find the cost of a Server
ACM check and an Object ACM check to be ∼ 8µs
and ∼ 62µs, respectively. Also, the latency of read
(write) system call depend on the block size being
read (written). Since the cost of ACM checks is fixed
per system call, the normalized latency with ACM
checks for read and write system calls will change
based on the block size. The measurements pre-
sented in Figure 6 are the costs for 32MB size blocks.
Since the application makes single blocking I/O re-
quests, I/O throughput can be computed as (block
size/latency of system call). For this block size, we
find the read and write throughput to be 170.5 MB/s
and 40.81 MB/s, respectively, with ACM, as com-
pared to 174.81 MB/s and 40.98 MB/s, respectively,
without ACM. These results demonstrate that the
ACM component minimally impacts the performance
of PVFS system calls, both in terms of latency and
throughput.
Scalability We use write throughput to demon-
strate the impact of ACM component on a storage
domain’s scalability. Figure 7 shows the relative per-
formance profile of a storage domain with increasing
number of VMs, using single VM measurements as
the base case. Based on memory size, the maximum
number of VMs configured with 128MB RAM han-
dled by our test platform is 3 (theoretically, the limit
is 4, given that there is no memory overcommitment;
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Figure 7: Scalability of the vOSD storage domain.
ory itself, resulting in a limit of 3). Here, single VM
numbers for both, with- and without-ACM, cases are
normalized to one. In case of more than one VM
with ACM (without ACM), cumulative performance
of all VMs relative to the single VM with ACM (with-
out ACM) is shown, along with individual compo-
nents. A near-identical performance profile demon-
strates that adding ACM functionality does not im-
pact the scalability of a storage domain.
Dynamic Access Control As stated earlier, the
ACM module offers dynamic role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) functionality. This is demonstrated by
dynamically changing the network related behavior of
a guest VM and by showing its effect on three storage
workloads running in the guest VM. The first work-
load continuously writes to a file; the second workload
continuously reads from a file; and the third workload
continuously reads attributes of a file (i.e., performs
meta-data reads). These workloads are identified as
write, read and getattr, respectively. Figure 8 shows
the time line on X-axis and behavior of workloads on
the Y-axis in terms of Access Coefficient. A value of
access coefficient greater than 0.0 indicates successful
access, while a value of 0.0 indicates an access fail-
ure. For data read and write workloads, the access
coefficient is computed as the ratio of instantaneous
throughput and maximum throughput achieved. For
meta-data read write workload, success of access re-
sults in access coefficient value of 1.0, while failure of
access, in 0.0.
A script executing in the Dom0 incrementally
opens four ssh connections to the guest VM, and then
incrementally drops them. The script opens connec-
tions one and two at 60 seconds and 120 seconds,
respectively, and opens connections three and four
at 180 seconds. These connections are dropped at
60 seconds intervals starting at 240 seconds. These
dynamic changes in number of network connections






















Figure 8: Effect of dynamic RBAC on different work-
loads
based on the Equation 1. The storage domain uses
policy 2 to define dynamic roles for the guest VM,
which affects its access to the objects stored in the
vOSD.
As demonstrated by the results, the data write
workload can successfully function expect in time pe-
riod (60, 420) seconds. This is due to the fact that
the “trust” value of the guest VM in this time period
remains < 1.0, which prohibits write access to the ob-
jects for the VM. Similarly, the data read workload
and meta-data read workload can successfully func-
tion expect in time periods (120, 360) and (180, 240),
in which the “trust” values are < 0.50 and < 0.25, re-
spectively. These results show the ability of the stor-
age domain to dynamically adapt the access control
imposed on a guest VM with changes in its “trust”
value, as perceived by the trust controller.
6.1.2 Differentiated Storage
For differentiated storage, we compare the latency
of two PVFS system calls – ecreate and pre-existing
create, both performed from a user-level application
inside a VM, directly using the PVFS libraries. In
this experiment the vOSD storage domain consists of
three storage servers – one MDS, one I/O server with
label mobile, and other I/O server with label fixed.
Based on the value of the user.iohint attribute speci-
fied with the ecreate call, the storage domain chooses
one of the I/O servers for storing the object data.
With the create call, the client chooses an I/O server
in a round-robin fashion. Table 2 shows the latency of
these system calls, as measured from the client VM.
The difference between the latencies is due to extra
processing performed in the MDS to match the at-
tribute with IOHints of various I/O servers, and due
to additional I/O in the MDS to store the extended
attribute, the latency of which is based on the disk
being used for the storage space at the MDS. For this
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Figure 9: Performance isolation in vOSD storage do-
main
experiment, all storage servers share the same SCSI
disk. We expect the latency to be lower for different
kinds of storage, such as a flash disk, which provides
better performance for short, random, reads of ex-
tended attributes [51].
In order to show the performance benefits of dif-
ferentiated storage, we run the vOSD storage domain
with two servers, one MDS and one I/O server. There
are two competing VMs performing different kinds of
I/O activities. One VM, VM1, is continuously creat-
ing new extended attributes for an object, while the
other VM, VM2, is doing writes to the same object.
We plot the performance of VM2 executing simulta-
neously with VM1 in two scenarios – one, where both
MDS and I/O server share the same SCSI disk for
their storage space, termed ‘perturbation’, and two,
where MDS uses a ramdisk for its storage space while
the I/O server uses the SCSI disk, termed ‘pertur-
bation with differentiated-storage’. The throughput
of VM2 without the presence of VM1 is used as the
base line, labeled as ‘no perturbation’, and the perfor-
mance of VM2 in scenarios described above is plotted
relative to this base line performance. Figure 9 shows
VM2’s write throughput for different block sizes.
These results demonstrate that VM1 can substan-
tially degrade VM2’s I/O performance, since both
MDS and I/O server must share the disk I/O path,
along with the CPU. However, with differentiated
storage, the vOSD storage domain provides much
better performance isolation. Performance impact
Figure 10: IOzone small I/O performance
with differentiated storage emanates from the fact
that the MDS and the I/O server share the same CPU
to serve VM1 and VM2, respectively. We expect the
performance with differentiated storage to be even
closer to the base line in future multicore machines,
where different storage servers can be provided with
separate physical CPUs.
6.2 IOzone Benchmark
To understand the performance implications of the
ACM component on application-level workloads, we
evaluate the I/O performance of our prototype stor-
age domain using the IOzone benchmark [5]. The
IOzone benchmark measures file I/O performance for
many file-system operations, such as read, write, and
mmaped I/O. This benchmark is executed on a client
VM, and accesses the vOSD via kernel’s VFS inter-
face. The goal of these experiments is to demon-
strate that (1) using ACM component does not signif-
icantly impact the I/O performance of the vOSD stor-
age domain, and (2) the vOSD storage domain can
provide significant performance benefits to a client
VM, along with enhanced functionality, by utilizing
Dom0’s computational resources, which is an option
that is not available to a block-based virtual disk
(VBD) based on a physical disk partition.
For IOzone’s write throughput experiments, we
also enable an additional parameter for storage
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servers, called NoDataSync (NDS). This option al-
lows storage servers to buffer writes before they are
flushed to the disk. Without this option, every write
is flushed to the disk. Using this option allows the
vOSD storage domain to provide much better perfor-
mance by reducing the latency of each write opera-
tion. The tradeoff is that the storage domain may
loose data in the event of a server failover. However,
using redundancy with this option enabled could pro-
vide similar performance benefits, at a reduced risk
of failure.
As mentioned earlier, the PVFS file system does
not utilize a client’s page cache, and hence the I/O
throughput of the vOSD storage domain for small
block sizes is limited – anywhere from .8% upto 14%
of that of a VBD. Keeping this limitation in mind, for
small read and writes, we only demonstrate the com-
parative performance of the vOSD storage domain
with- and without-ACM. Figure 10 depicts read and
write throughput with varying block sizes for a file of
size 4MB. Since ACM imposes a fixed cost on each
I/O operation, with increasing block sizes, overall
cost for access checks decreases for a fixed file size due
to a decrease in total number of I/O operations be-
ing performed. The relative performance, measured
as small quantity/larger quantity for each block size,
varies within (86.5%, 99.3) and (84%, 100%) of each
other, for read and write respectively. These results
demonstrate that the ACM component minimally im-
pacts the I/O performance of the vOSD storage do-
main.
For large I/O, we include results for two file sizes,
128MB and 512MB, respectively. We also include
the results for VBD. These results are shown in Fig-
ures 11 and 12. For a 128MB file, the client VM’s
page cache is no longer effective. Hence the perfor-
mance of read for VBD is around 45MB/s. However,
vOSD continues to enjoy the benefits of the vOSD
storage domain’s page cache, and hence can provide
read throughput of upto 150MB/s. For writes, the
performance of vOSD without NDS trails the perfor-
mance of VBD, since every write must go to disk in
both cases – however, vOSD’s path to physical disk
is longer than VBD. However, vOSD with NDS uses
asynchronous write in the storage domain, and hence
can provide write throughput of ∼ 120MB/s, upto
∼ 2X of that of VBD.
For a 512MB file, both the client VM’s and the
vOSD storage domain’s page caches are no longer ef-
fective, but larger memory in the storage domain still
enables better performance for vOSD for large block
Figure 11: IOzone large read performance
Figure 12: IOzone large write performance
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sizes, since virtual network I/O is much faster than
hard disk access. For writes, vOSD without NDS is
slower than VBD, for the same reason as described
above. However, vOSD with NDS can overlap asyn-
chronous writes with disk I/O, and hence can provide
∼ 1.5X performance gain over VBD.
Similar to the previous case of small file size,
there is minimal performance impact of ACM com-
ponent on the vOSD storage domain for large file
sizes. The relative performance of read varies
within (98.5%, 99.6%) for a 128MB file, and within
(88.1%, 99.9%) for a 512MB file. Similarly, for writes,
it varies within (89%, 99.9%) for a 128MB file, and
within (92%, 100%) for a 512MB file.
The IOzone benchmark results demonstrate that
the enhanced access control functionalities of the
storage domain can be implemented with minimal
performance overhead for the guest VMs. In particu-
lar, the throughput for read and write operations de-
grades only minimally when utilizing the ACM com-
ponent. Also, an object based storage domain makes
it possible to better exploit the resources available
at the storage domain as compared to a block based
storage virtualization solution.
7 Related Work
The O2S2 architecture shares its object based de-
sign with many distributed file-systems, such as Lus-
tre [6], Panasas [59] and Ceph [57]. While the main
focus of these file-systems has been high performance
and scalability, it is possible to extend them with
enhanced per-object functionality and properties ex-
plored as part of this work. A similar approach is
taken by Piernas et al [42], where they extend Lustre
with active storage functionality.
Storage systems utilize various data properties as
hints for storage management, such as data encod-
ing, fault model, timing model [15] and frequency of
access [31]. These properties can also influence other
properties. For example, frequency of access can in-
dicate whether certain data should be stored com-
pressed [20], or decide reliability guarantees provided
to it [60]. These properties can be similarly incorpo-
rated as hints in the O2S2 architecture at an object
level.
Previous research in security management for net-
work attached storage, both at an object-level [27]
and block-level [16], utilizes un-forgeable crypto-
graphic capabilities issues by storage servers to en-
force access control. In contrast, we use a multi-layer
approach, where capabilities external to the storage
system, labels provided by the VMM, are utilized to
enforce access control. These capabilities are used in
a manner that is oblivious to storage clients. Our ap-
proach is similar to using external hardware compo-
nents, such as Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) [13],
to store and provide capabilities about an potentially
untrusted execution entity.
Our work is similar in spirit to semantic virtual-
ization of multimedia devices [45], where semantic
information based on a higher level API (v4l) is used
to provide sharing of content and functionality for
multimedia devices. Further, service domains imple-
menting the virtualization service (such as a storage
domain, a driver domain providing network virtual-
ization in a virtualized environment [43], or a VMedia
runtime [45] for multimedia device virtualization) can
use their computational resources to implement ad-
ditional functionalities/properties for virtualized de-
vices. This is not necessarily the case when these are
directly supported by the underlying physical hard-
ware itself. Examples include image manipulation in
VMedia, additional computations on data in active
storage, either in storage servers [42], or in the hard-
ware itself [46], and TCP segment offload in virtual
NICs [36].
8 Conclusions and Future
Work
This paper presents an object-based storage system
architecture, and a PVFS file-system based proto-
type implementation, called the vOSD storage do-
main. The storage virtualization service, enabled by
the vOSD storage domain, provides virtual object-
storage devices (vOSDs) to VMs in a virtualized en-
vironment. An object-based interface not only allows
for efficient sharing of physical devices, it also en-
ables dynamic, role-based, access control and usability
based performance isolation in a heterogeneous stor-
age environment. Performance results demonstrate
that our storage domain implementation provides en-
hanced functionalities without adversely affecting the
performance and scalability of the storage service.
Further, by efficiently utilizing Dom0’s resources, the
storage domain can also provide certain performance
benefits to client VMs, such as the use of its page
cache as a storage cache.
In the future, the PVFS based interface for the
client can be replaced with a standardized T10 inter-
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face [56]. This permits the vOSD to be entirely de-
coupled from the specific vOSD storage domain im-
plementation. Translation between the T10 interface
and the underlying storage domain’s storage access
mechanisms will be implemented in the vOSD stor-
age domain itself. To this effect, Xen’s virtual SCSI
frontend [50] can be enhanced to make it compatible
with T10, and similarly, the virtual SCSI backend can
be merged with the storage domain. Additionally,
it is possible to utilize a different file-system back-
end, LWFS [38], which promises efficient I/O in large
scale systems and more flexibility for implementing
per-object properties, such as checkpointing.
As part of future work, the current vOSD stor-
age domain implementation can be extended to make
it distributed, such that various storage servers can
be located on different physical machines. This will
require integration with a distributed trust manage-
ment infrastructure, such as shamon [35]. Also, ex-
tending the vOSD storage domain with logging in-
frastructure for SLA auditing will enhance its secu-
rity and trust related properties, as discussed in Sec-
tion 2.2.1. As demonstrated by the object-based stor-
age virtualization service, there are multiple benefits
of integrating security and trust functionalities pro-
vided by the underlying platform. In order to at-
tain these benefits for virtualization services in a dis-
tributed environment comprising of multiple phys-
ical machines, it is imperative that these security
and trust management solutions themselves be dis-
tributed. Ongoing and future work in this area will
address the mechanisms and policies for trust man-
agement in a distributed environment [35]. By inte-
grating virtualization services with distributed, vir-
tualization aware, trust management solutions, we
can provide secure virtualization services for the en-
terprise. Another aspect of this integration involves
building better trust models that accurately reflect
the “trust” properties of a VM. These models will
utilize the behavioral information provided by various
monitoring components, such as XenAccess [40] and
netmon [32]. These trust models will enable virtual-
ization services to implement better and more mean-
ingful dynamic access control policies.
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